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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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TRENDS

In Communist Propaganda

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
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22 FEBRUARY 1973

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 12 - 18 FEBRUARY 1973

Moscow (2976 items)Peking (1089 items)

Vietnam	(13%)	15%	Domestic Issues	(52%)	52%
[Kosygin Reception	(--)	3%]	Indochina	(23%)	22%
of PRG Envoy			[Vietnam	(7%)	17%]
[Pham Van Dong	(- -)	2%]	[Cambodia	(15%)	3%]
Interview			[Laos	(1%)	2%]
Monetary Crisis	(2%)	7%	DPRK Foreign	(3%)	6%
USSR-Hungary	(--)	6%	Minister in PRC		
Treaty Anniversary			Monetary Crisis	(15%)	3%
China	(6%)	4%			
Luna 21 Moon Mission	(1%)	3%			

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

Hanoi and Front media have now specifically charged the United States as well as Saigon with failing to implement the terms of the peace accord, claiming among other things that there has been a deliberate delay in the removal of U.S. mines from DRV waters. However, Premier Pham Van Dong, in a 20 February report to a special session of the DRV National Assembly, confined his remarks to the more usual complaint that the United States is supporting Saigon's "sabotage" of the accord. Propaganda on violations of the cease-fire has included wide publicity for a 16 February appeal by the four-party Joint Military Commission for a halt to the fighting--an appeal which purportedly resulted from the PRG's initiative. Sparse attention to the international conference on Vietnam, scheduled to begin on 26 February, includes VNA's 22 February announcement that the DRV delegation headed by Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh left that day for Paris. Hanoi media are not known to have acknowledged that DRV and PRG deputy foreign ministers departed earlier and made stopovers in both Peking and Moscow.

Peking discreetly limited its authoritative comment on Indochina to the two-day interval between presidential assistant Kissinger's visits to the DRV and the PRC. During that interval a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article seconded Vietnamese communist protests of alleged violations of the Paris agreement, and Peking played up Sino-Vietnamese solidarity in comment marking the anniversary of the South Vietnam PLAF's unification.

Moscow, like Peking, carried the text of the communique on Kissinger's visit to Hanoi, and it has duly reported other developments, including Vietnamese communist charges of allied violations of the cease-fire. Soviet commentators have continued to stress that the Vietnam agreement should lead to a period of general relaxation of tensions and cooperation, while at the same time warning that such a development is endangered by Peking's anti-Sovietism and its "collusion" with the United States.

PRG ANTICIPATES, AMPLIFIES DRV COMPLAINTS ABOUT U.S. ACTIONS

Vietnamese communist media for the most part refrained from specific criticism of U.S. implementation of the peace accord until after Presidential adviser Kissinger's 10-13 February visit to Hanoi. However, the front page of the 15 February NHAN DAN carried not only the U.S.-DRV joint communique on Kissinger's visit but an editorial

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which contained Hanoi's most detailed castigation of U.S. actions. In addition to repeating the charge that the United States has been "tolerating and harboring" Saigon's "sabotage" of the peace accord, the editorial claimed that the United States had "refused" to inform the Joint Military Commission (JMC) and the International Commission for Control and Supervision (ICCS) of its troop withdrawal schedule and locations,* had "refused" to dismantle its military bases, and was delaying the removal of mines in DRV territorial waters. These specific charges had been voiced the day before in a Liberation Radio commentary, and as early as 10 February a PRG Foreign Ministry statement had introduced the charge that the United States was unwilling to dismantle its military bases. Hanoi had shown inconsistency when the PRG charge about U.S. bases was echoed in a NHAN DAN editorial on 11 February but was not repeated the next day in a DRV Foreign Ministry statement specifically endorsing the PRG statement.

The impression of the PRG's taking the lead in criticizing the United States was reinforced by a 21 February LPA statement, carried by VNA on the 22d, which elaborated on the complaints in the NHAN DAN editorial of the 15th. For example, LPA said that the peace agreement called for the removal of the mines to begin immediately but that the work had not yet actually begun. It added that "the United States has used false pretexts to prolong the time for the preparation and refused to use all the force and means at its disposal with a view to delaying and dragging on the removal of the mines." VNA had reported on 6 February that a U.S. delegation concerned with the removal of mines had arrived in Haiphong, but the issue had been largely ignored in Hanoi propaganda until the 15th when the NHAN DAN editorial charged the United States with dilatory tactics. Also on the 15th, VNA summarized a PRAVDA interview with a Soviet merchant marine official which noted that "even before the United States had deactivated all the mines in Vietnamese ports, Soviet freighters had shipped the first batches of aid goods to Haiphong. On 30 January, the first ship transporting food arrived in Haiphong."**

* Article 8 b of the protocol on the cease-fire stipulates that "within five days after the entry into force of the cease-fire, the United States shall inform the four-party JMC and the ICCS of the general plans for timing of complete troop withdrawals"

** The interview, published in the 13 February PRAVDA, in fact spoke of the ship arriving at the "Haiphong roadstead" and noted that on 12 February, when it had completed unloading operations, the port was still closed.

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On the issue of withdrawal of U.S. troops, the LPA statement maintained that without having the United States' plans and timetable, the JMC and ICCS cannot supervise the withdrawal and do not have a basis to confirm whether the United States is complying with Article 5 of the agreement. The statement also noted that "Saigon sources have disclosed that the United States has turned thousands of U.S. military personnel into civilian personnel, who continue serving in the Saigon armed forces, thus seriously violating" the agreed provision. Like the NHAN DAN editorial, LPA rejected the contention that U.S. bases had already been transferred to Saigon, but it added that "everyone knows the DRV and the United States have spent much time discussing this matter and have agreed that all military bases of the United States and other foreign countries in South Vietnam shall be completely dismantled, as stipulated in Article 6 of the agreement." LPA charged that the United States' "unilateral declaration" on bases has caused the negotiations and agreement on this matter to "lose all their significance." In addition to demanding the dismantling of bases, the statement asserted that the weapons of foreign troops must be taken out when the troops withdraw.

As in the 15 February issue, NHAN DAN on the 16th balanced a new attack on the United States with further publicity for Kissinger's visit. The paper carried on its front page a picture of Kissinger meeting with Pham Van Dong, Le Duc Tho, and Nguyen Duy Trinh and printed a Commentator article protesting the transfer of the U.S. Air Force headquarters for Southeast Asia from Saigon to Thailand. The article charged that the move constitutes preparation for a new war and "seriously endangers" the peace, independence, and sovereignty of Southeast Asian countries. "The transformation of Thailand into a war base," the paper declared, poses a threat to the Indochinese people and "is an act of abetting the Saigon administration in opposing peace and national concord and lays the groundwork for the United States to resume hostilities against the Vietnamese people when it deems necessary."

PHAM VAN DONG AT NATIONAL ASSEMBLY	Premier Pham Van Dong, in his 20 February report to the DRV National Assembly, routinely accused the United States of giving "approval and support" to the Saigon administration in its "open and systematic sabotage" of the implementation of the peace accord, and he did not mention the alleged U.S. actions cited in the NHAN DAN editorial on the 15th. While in discussing the peace accord Dong generally hewed closely to the language of the
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agreement, in discussing U.S. aid he went beyond that language when he said it is the "obligation" of the United States to contribute to healing the wounds of war and to postwar construction in the DRV. The Premier paraphrased the agreement in declaring that its implementation will create conditions for establishing a new, equal, and mutually beneficial relationship between the DRV and the United States. No Hanoi propaganda has repeated the reference in the joint U.S.-DRV communique to "normalization" of relations--a phrase presumably suggested by Kissinger.

DRV, PRG PUBLICIZE FOUR-PARTY APPEAL, PROTEST GVN BEHAVIOR

Both Hanoi and Liberation Radio on 17 February repeatedly broadcast the appeal for a halt to military operations adopted the previous day by the four-party Joint Military Commission. The communists claimed that the appeal was the result of the initiative of PRG representative to the JMC Tran Van Tra. And the Front radio on the 16th released a statement made by Tra at the JMC meeting on the 14th in which he called for approval of an appeal, said to have been agreed upon at the JMC meeting of the 8th. Tra not only touched on such matters raised in the four-party appeal as the need to suspend military activities, spelled out in Article two of the cease-fire protocol, but also proposed further directives. He called for the appeal to be disseminated in a week or less, for JMC-ICCS teams to check on its dissemination, for efforts to achieve reconciliation and an end to propaganda distorting the peace accord, for compliance with Article 11 of the agreement guaranteeing democratic liberties, and for cooperation in urgently setting up the regional and local JMC teams and relocating the communist military delegation in suitable quarters.

The communists evidently expected Saigon to balk at approving the appeal, since initial propaganda--including an article in the 17 February NHAN DAN--accused the GVN of refusing to sign it. In fact, Saigon media released the appeal on the 17th but did not give it as extensive publicity as the communists did. An editorial in the 18 February NHAN DAN acknowledged Saigon's position, claiming that the GVN's agreement to the appeal was "a positive result of our struggle" to implement the accord. The paper reiterated Tra's other demands, including his call for JMC-ICCS supervision of the dissemination of the appeal and for cooperation in the deployment of the JMC teams.

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**ALLEGED SAIGON
VIOLATIONS**

Communist official statements and commentaries continue to chronicle alleged Saigon violations of the cease-fire agreement. Tran Van Tra's statement at the 14 February meeting of the four-party JMC listed several alleged military violations, including incidents involving the JMC. Tra also observed that the United States cannot dodge responsibility for violations of the cease-fire on the ground that they are committed by Saigon, and he maintained that "it is the United States' evasion of responsibility that has encouraged the Saigon administration to violate the cease-fire."

Tra characterized as "particularly serious" ARVN "nibbling operations" near Cua Viet, Quang Tri, and in Tay Ninh--both scenes of intense fighting at the time of the cease-fire. He also included in this category operations in Sa Huynh village, Duc Pho district, Quang Ngai Province; Liberation Radio on the 20th charged that GVN land, air, and naval attacks on the "Sa Huynh liberated area" continued even after the issuance of the JMC appeal. In a list of "typical violations of a particularly grave nature," Tra accused the GVN of attacking a village southwest of Pleiku which had been proposed by the PRG as a site for the release of prisoners, shelling the agreed site for the release of POW's north of the Thach Han River in Quang Tri, using JMC orange-colored vehicles to lead a military assault on Highway 14, and attacking a site in the Can Tho area on the day the PRG military delegation to the JMC was to be met there. In the same vein, the communists on the 21st charged that on 19 February Saigon planes had raided a PRG area in Duc Co where workers were constructing a residence for the ICCS.

Such actions were officially condemned in a protest by the PRG military delegation, sent to the GVN and U.S. military delegations on the 17th and publicized by Hanoi and the Front on the 19th. The protest note charged that ARVN attacks on "liberated areas" and "systematic" attacks on sites for the pickup of PRG delegations and for prisoner release are proof of Saigon's "premeditated and systematic scheme" to delay the deployment of JMC teams. Also on the 17th, according to an LPA report the following day, the spokesman of the PLAF Command scored alleged Saigon actions, denied "false" Saigon and U.S. reports of communist violations, and reaffirmed that the PLAF would seriously implement the accord and punish actions violating it. Liberation Radio reported on the 21st that on the previous day Tran Van Tra had sent a note to the ICCS denouncing cease-fire violations by the U.S.-GVN side. The protest listed specific alleged military violations, leading off with a complaint about actions in the Sa Huynh area.

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Broader attacks on Saigon's policies also continued, with comment particularly scoring the GVN's efforts to isolate the DRV and PRG military delegations from contact with newsmen and South Vietnamese citizens. Such charges have been documented with references to specific incidents, including the refusal of Saigon authorities to allow foreign newsmen to attend the 15 February PRG military delegation's reception marking the PLAF anniversary. The 21 February LPA statement included criticism of domestic policies, charging that the GVN has "increased fascist measures in a bid to prevent the realization of national reconciliation and concord and to suppress the people's democratic liberties." The charge that Saigon is hindering reconciliation and concord was dealt with at some length in a 16 February NHAN DAN editorial, which noted that there should be reconciliation not only between the two parties but with other elements as well. The editorial added: "In reality there are three political forces, and it is important to insure active participation of the third force and equality among the three components."

PRG-GVN PARIS TALKS Hanoi and the Front provided little information on the first five sessions of the preliminary PRG-GVN conference, held in Paris from 5 to 17 February. On 20 February, the day of the sixth session, NHAN DAN published an article by its Paris correspondent Hong Ha which contained some details on the deadlock over selecting a site for the official consultative conference between the two sides. The article observed that it was preferable to hold the conference in South Vietnam and that it would be logical for the meeting site to rotate between the areas of the two sides.

The article also noted the view that if the conference were to be held in Saigon, it would have to be held in the center of the city and not at a military base. This point was underlined in a 20 February statement by the spokesman of the PRG Paris delegation, carried by LPA on the 22d, which rejected a reported GVN statement that the communists had refused to hold the conference in Saigon. The PRG spokesman noted that the PRG would be willing to meet in the center of the capital but that the GVN had rejected that suggestion as well as the proposal for rotating sites. In response to the GVN's alternative suggestion that the conference be held outside South Vietnam, the spokesman said, the PRG at the meeting on the 20th had proposed that the two sides choose a site in an area bordering zones controlled by either side or, if that were unacceptable, that the conference be held in Paris. An LPA report on the 20 February session added that the Saigon

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PEKING MUTES COMMENT DURING KISSINGER'S HANOI, PRC VISITS

Treading with care during the period encompassing the Kissinger visits to the DRV and China, Peking discreetly limited its authoritative comment on Indochina and other sensitive issues to the two-day interval between the presidential assistant's stays in the two communist capitals. During that interval Peking marked the anniversary of the South Vietnam PLAF's unification, highlighted by an editorial in the Chinese army paper, and issued a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article to second Vietnamese communist statements protesting alleged violations of the Paris agreement by Saigon. Peking promptly carried the text of the communique on Kissinger's visit to Hanoi and replayed a VNA report on the DRV's release of additional American prisoners during his stay as a good will gesture.

Peking has remained silent on its role in the international conference on Vietnam, though NCNA's reports on the 18-20 February stopover in Peking of DRV and PRG vice foreign ministers noted that they were on their way to the conference. The guests had "a very cordial and friendly talk" with Chou En-lai and Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei on the 19th.

PLAF ANNIVERSARY Peking expanded its coverage of the PLAF's anniversary compared with last year's, including not only a PRC Defense Ministry "report meeting" on the 14th and a PRG embassy film reception on the 15th, but also a 15 February LIBERATION ARMY DAILY editorial and a PRG ambassador's reception on the 14th that was addressed by Chinese Politburo alternate member Li Te-sheng. The Chinese used the occasion to reiterate their welcome for the Vietnam agreement while underscoring Sino-Vietnamese solidarity both during the war and in the "new period." Continuing Peking's effort to play up Sino-Vietnamese affinities, the editorial cited Mao's recent remark that the Chinese and Vietnamese are "of the same family," and it invoked both Mao and Ho Chi Minh as having personally nurtured the "longstanding, everlasting, and unbreakable" unity between the two countries. The editorial concluded by pledging Peking's continuing support and assistance to the Vietnamese as its "proletarian internationalist duty."

Li Te-sheng offered a similar pledge at the PRG ambassador's reception, but the Vietnamese used the anniversary to impute a stronger undertaking to the Chinese and to take a tougher stance on the South Vietnamese situation than the Chinese. The ambassador declared at the report meeting that the Chinese "have decided, in the current new situation, to step up their support" to the Vietnamese.

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He made a point of calling for high vigilance against violations of the Paris agreement, adding that the PLAF would "raise its combat effectiveness so as to become a powerful mainstay of the whole people in the political struggle." At his reception the ambassador called the PRG "the sole and authentic representative" of the South Vietnamese people, a claim that the Chinese have been unwilling to endorse.

VIOLATIONS OF ACCORD Peking used the vehicle of a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article--the lowest level of authoritative comment--to second recent DRV and PRG foreign ministry protests censuring Saigon for "serious violations" of the Paris agreement. The Commentator article, on the 15th, accused Saigon of disregarding from the outset its commitment under the agreement and of using "despicable means" to violate and sabotage the accord. While warning that world public opinion is watching "with deep concern" the situation since the armistice, Commentator mentioned U.S. involvement only in the last sentence, pointing out that as a signatory the United States also has the responsibility of "enjoining" Saigon to observe the agreement. However, NCNA's report of the 15 February NHAN DAN editorial on alleged violations of the peace agreement contained specific indictments of the United States, including the charges that it has failed to dismantle bases in South Vietnam and has deliberately delayed the removal of mines from North Vietnamese waters.

The LIBERATION ARMY DAILY editorial on the PLAF anniversary noted that realization of the agreement's provisions requires "incumbent efforts of the parties concerned," but there was no criticism of any of the parties for violating the terms. The PRG ambassador said at his reception on the 14th that the United States and Saigon must bear responsibility for plots by "warlord and fascist forces" to obstruct the agreement.

The 14 February press communique on the North Korean foreign minister's visit to Peking cited both sides as welcoming the Vietnam agreement while calling for strict observance of its terms in order that a contribution may be made to easing tension in Asia. The communique also took note of continuing U.S. "aggression" in Laos and Cambodia. Peking's first direct reference to the continued U.S. military presence in Thailand since the Vietnam agreement appeared in an NCNA report on the 14th of an announcement by Pentagon spokesman Friedheim to the effect that the headquarters for all U.S. air operations in Southeast Asia will be transferred from South Vietnam to Thailand. NCNA cited AP as saying that attacks against Laos and Cambodia will be directed from the new headquarters.

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Chinese leaders' foreign policy. Without amplification, the commentator claimed that "the Chinese leaders have demonstrated in their actions on the international arena in recent days that they are firmly opposed to an easing of international tension and to any concrete action which will strengthen peace and security." The broadcast went on to claim that "imperialism" long ago recognized that the major thrust of Peking's "two-superpowers argument" is against the USSR and that the criticism of the U.S. "imperialists" is added only to make the Chinese look good in the eyes of Third World countries. It repeated other comment in claiming that the Chinese approve of the continued stationing of U.S. troops in Asia, and it said that "the negative stand" adopted by Peking leaders toward the Soviet-proposed system of an Asian collective security system is "another source of pleasure for the imperialists . . . who wholeheartedly support the claim of Peking leaders that this system is aimed at encircling China." The commentator concluded by saying that "the imperialists also support and promote another slanderous claim by the Chinese leaders--that there will be the danger of Soviet subversion of Southeast Asia following the U.S. military disengagement."

Current Moscow propaganda hailing Vietnam as a lesson for the Third World includes a series of four radio talks by IZVESTIYA's V. Kudryavtsev beamed to Africa from 14 to 17 February. Kudryavtsev reiterated the argument, which he had advanced in his IZVESTIYA article on the 6th, that Soviet aid was effective in bringing Vietnam victory and led to the strengthening of the recipient's independence. He also assailed current Chinese foreign policy as being contrary to the progress of the national liberation movements. And he claimed that "the fact that the Maoist leaders of the PRC have made outright anti-Sovietism a major aspect of their foreign policy only hampers the struggle against imperialism" and undermines the unity of the anti-imperialist front.

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the "Vientiane government," and the DRV is not named in the accord, although the various references to "foreign countries" can be read as embracing the North Vietnamese.

+ The "general principles" of the agreement stipulate that the neutrality of Laos and the 1962 Geneva agreements must be respected and observed by "the Lao parties concerned, the United States, Thailand, and other foreign countries," without specifying the DRV. The October proposal had called upon only the United States to respect the Geneva agreement, but the December draft appealed to "the various signatories of the 1961-1962 Geneva conference on Laos as well as other countries in the world" to respect and implement the agreement.

+ The provision for a cease-fire-in-place comprising a cessation of bombing and military involvement by "foreign countries" as well as of the Lao parties, seems to be a minor concession to Vientiane as the December draft had specified an end to "U.S." bombing as well as a halt to military activity by "the various armed forces in Laos."

+ The agreement allows the parties to pass through each others' zones to supply their men with food. Reprisals and discrimination against collaborators are prohibited, as in the earlier NLHS proposals. Assistance to refugees is provided for, but unlike the earlier NLHS proposals, Vientiane is not now given sole responsibility for provision of such help.

+ The introduction of military personnel and armaments of "foreign countries except for those provided for by the 1954 and 1962 agreements," *is banned. Replacement of damaged or worn out armaments and war materials is to be discussed and agreed upon by the two parties.* This provision is similar to that of the December draft except for the reference to the Geneva agreements. A protocol to the 1962 Geneva agreement allowed the introduction of defensive armaments deemed necessary by the RLG. The December draft had also mentioned a role for the new coalition government in requesting and distributing replacement weapons and materials. The omission of such a provision now may represent a concession to Vientiane.

+ Within 60 days of the establishment of a provisional national union government and a political consultative council, the total withdrawal of "all military personnel, regular and irregular troops of foreign countries, and the dissolution of military and paramilitary organizations of foreign countries" must be completed,

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as well as the dissolution of "special forces" organized by "foreigners" and their bases and installations. A similar provision in the December draft had specified dismantling bases and dissolving special forces of "the United States and of the various countries affiliated with the U.S. side." It had not, however, specified a U.S. withdrawal, calling instead for withdrawal of all advisers, military personnel, and regular and irregular troops of "foreign countries" within 90 days of the signing of the agreement. The October proposal had specified a U.S. withdrawal, but had also prohibited the maintenance in Laos of bases or armed forces by "any foreign country." The October plan had specified that the United States must stop using Thai bases and forces for "aggression" in Laos, but the December draft had not named Thailand.

+ Each Lao party shall return to the other "persons regardless of their nationality" captured during the war, the exchange to be completed within 60 days after the establishment of the provisional government and the political consultative council. Subsequently, the parties will exchange information on missing personnel. Unlike the October and December proposals, the current accord does not explicitly specify that the prisoner exchange must be timed with the withdrawal of troops.

+ The political provisions of the cease-fire agreement are similar to those in the NLHS' December and October proposals. It provides for free and democratic general elections for a national assembly and for an official national union government. Pending elections, within 30 days of the signing of the agreement, a new provisional national union government and a political consultative council are to be formed. The provisional government is apparently to be basically dual, composed of equal numbers of representatives of the Vientiane government and the "patriotic forces" and also including two neutralist "personalities" chosen by the two sides. The December and October proposals had called for a tripartite provisional government, composed of equal numbers of three factions: the NLHS, the Patriotic Neutralist Forces and other neutralists, and the Vientiane side. The current agreement does not name Souvanna Phouma, merely noting that the future prime minister "will not be included in the two equal numbers of representatives of the two parties."

+ The political consultative council--long pressed by the NLHS and opposed by Vientiane--apparently retains the essential function provided for in the October and December NLHS proposals, but

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presumably in deference to Vientiane some of the rhetoric is toned down. Where the earlier proposals had characterized the council as "the supreme organization for national unity," the reference to "supremacy" is now omitted. Like the provisional government, the council is apparently to have a basically dual nature, consisting of equal numbers of representatives of the Vientiane government and "patriotic forces" and "a number" of neutralists chosen by the two sides. Earlier proposals had given it a tripartite nature like the earlier proposals on the provisional government. The current agreement provides that the council function on the principle of unanimity, a provision not appearing in earlier NLHS proposals and presumably included at Vientiane's insistence. The council's functions seem to be similar to those proposed earlier: to consult with the provisional government on administering the country, implementing the agreement, and preparing for elections.

+ The current agreement adds a provision for neutralizing Luang Prabang to the earlier call for neutralization of Vientiane. It repeats the provision that pending elections the two parties will continue to administer their own areas.

+ The two parties "take note" of the U.S. statement that it will contribute to reconstruction in Indochina, and the accord provides that the provisional government will discuss with the United States its contribution to Laos. The October and December proposals had demanded that the United States bear the cost of war damages.

+ The current agreement provides for a "joint commission for implementation of the agreement" and for the ICC, composed of India, Poland, and Canada, to continue its activities as provided in the 1962 Geneva agreement. The October and December proposals had provided that the cease-fire be supervised by a joint committee assisted by the ICC.

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by Brezhnev on 21 December when he left it up to the Chinese and the laws of history to restore Sino-Soviet friendship.

RED STAR ON CHINA The military paper RED STAR on 3 February carried a harshly anti-Chinese article by V. Vasin taking to task the "Mao group"--a hardline formulation introduced in a landmark policy statement in November 1966--for its policies on such sensitive matters as nuclear weapons development and the territorial question. However, the provenance of the article--it was prepared by the NOVOSTI news agency in response to readers' inquiries about the situation in China--renders it less ominous than it might otherwise seem. Moreover, the article observed that Peking had abandoned its "frontal attack" for more circuitous approaches and that the Chinese are apprehensive over trends toward detente rather than over a Soviet threat to their security.

The article provides a commentary on the new Mao quotation, with its clear overtones of Sino-Soviet confrontation, which was introduced by Peking's 1973 New Year's Day editorial: "Dig tunnels deep, store grain everywhere, and never seek hegemony." The article related the tunnel digging and grain storing injunctions to Peking's effort to build up the country's military capability. Explaining that the grain stockpiling represents an attempt to restrict consumption in order to free funds for military expenditure, the article pointed out that expensive equipment is bought in capitalist countries for nuclear and missile plants. The article was vague on the significance of the tunnel digging, noting that the instruction means in practice that China's national economic development is oriented not toward improving living standards but toward a military buildup in the interest of Peking's "hegemonic aspirations" in the world arena.

More significantly, however, the article proceeded at this point to discuss Peking's portrayal of a Soviet military threat to China, and in this context it pointed out that the Soviets, unlike the Chinese, do not lay claim to the other side's territory and that Moscow had offered to conclude a treaty renouncing the use of force. After reviewing Peking's moves designed to isolate Moscow and to thwart Soviet diplomatic efforts, the article drew its conclusion that the "Maoists" are perturbed over the prospects of international detente and that their attempts to exploit tension show what their disavowal of an urge to hegemony means in practice.

Other recent Soviet comment has also reflected concern over Peking's portrayal of a Soviet threat, a concern that prompted Moscow to

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disclose its offer to conclude a bilateral treaty renouncing force and its repeated proposals since 1969 to undertake nonaggression commitments with the Chinese. Columnist Joseph Alsop, a persistent purveyor of the thesis of a Soviet menace to China, has again drawn Soviet ire after his recent trip to the PRC. A 7 February commentary on Alsop's trip by TASS commentator Eduard Baskakov, published the next day in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA and widely broadcast by Radio Moscow, charged that in his dispatches Alsop "concentrated his entire zeal" on depicting a threat of a Soviet nuclear strike against the PRC. In contrast to the 23 September Rattiani PRAVDA article denouncing Alsop for disseminating speculation about a Soviet preventive strike which Rattiani traced to the Pentagon and CIA,* Baskakov said that Peking "ordered" Alsop's articles and that this "inveterate anticommunist" was trying to justify Peking's anti-Soviet policy.

TRIANGULAR RELATIONS Moscow has been particularly concerned over the implications of the portrayal of a Soviet threat to China for its position in the triangular big-power relationship. This showed through, for instance, in a Moscow broadcast to China on the day after the Sino-Soviet treaty anniversary. After welcoming the Vietnam agreement as producing a major change in the situation in Asia, the broadcast argued that the United States is seeking to maintain its presence in Asia by playing on Sino-Soviet antagonism. According to the broadcast, "American radio stations" tell Chinese listeners about the Soviet troop concentration along the border while in programs beamed to the Soviet Union they report on Chinese missile development and deployment against the Soviets. The broadcast, which coincided with Kissinger's arrival in Peking, appealed for normalization of Sino-Soviet relations in order to counter the "intrigues and tricks" being played by the United States to foment hostility between the Chinese and Soviets.

A sophisticated and less propagandistic interpretation of "triangular diplomacy" appeared in an article by V.P. Lukin in this year's second issue of USA (signed to press 16 January). The article, which offers an account of the change in U.S. China policy undertaken by the Nixon Administration, deals mainly with the implications of the new Sino-U.S. relationship for the U.S. role in Asia, but it concludes with a warning against any

* See the TRENDS of 27 September 1972, pages 16-17.

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temptation for Washington to seek to exploit Sino-Soviet antagonism as a means of putting pressure on Moscow and reducing Soviet leverage. As befits a contribution to this journal of Americanologists, the article is an attempt to size up and account for U.S. calculations in the triangular situation, and on balance it serves to offset alarmist views of the evolving Sino-U.S. relationship by stressing objective realities that strengthen Moscow's hand and correspondingly dilute Peking's impact on world affairs.

In explaining how the Nixon Administration fashioned a new China policy in an effort to preserve U.S. interests in Asia during a period of shifting relations, Lukin argues that Washington changed its estimate of a need for a strong, broadly based U.S. military presence along China's borders to deter Peking. According to the article, the "Maoists' armed provocations" on the Sino-Soviet border in 1969 played "an extremely important role" in this reassessment. Lukin does not dwell further on the border dispute, but he elaborates at length on the various conceptual formulations and calculations used by American strategists taking account of the emergence of triangular diplomacy. He deals in particular with the balance of power school of thought, citing the view--without attribution--that there is a trend from an artificial postwar peace to a classic multilateral balancing of forces. From this premise, he says, advocates of this approach draw the conclusion that U.S. policy must be developed on the basis of balancing between the Soviet Union and China.

Significantly, Lukin indicates that within this school of thought there are those who oppose an alinement of the United States with the weaker China to counterbalance the stronger USSR, and that "the most appreciable influence" on U.S. policy is being exerted by those who recognize "the extreme danger" of seeking to pressure Moscow by exploiting the Maoist leadership's anti-Soviet line. As Lukin puts it, the United States is seeking to create a system of "parallel and mutually conditioned relations with both our country and the PRC." Quoting William E. Griffith, he cites the view that Soviet-U.S. negotiations are vital to U.S. security interests and that therefore Washington must observe neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

After a carefully argued section on the complexities introduced into U.S. relations with Japan by the rapprochement with the PRC, Lukin concludes with an appraisal of the near-term prospects for Sino-U.S. relations. Though his judgment that the momentum in

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this rapprochement has flagged did not hold up long, the mood of self-assurance he projects regarding Moscow's position in the triangular setting serves to cushion the impact of further developments in the Sino-U.S. relationship. Thus, he points to the Soviet-U.S. summit as demonstrating that "influential circles in Washington" realize the limited potential possessed by Peking to affect great-power relations. Lukin winds up his assessment, however, with a warning of a growth of international tension should Washington and Peking base the development of their relations primarily on anti-Soviet considerations. Cautiously and tentatively, he warns about "complications" that would result from "rash steps certain circles are possibly nurturing" in a direction going counter to the Soviet "peace program." In effect, then, he urges the United States to bear in mind the vital significance of Soviet-U.S. detente and to forego any temptation to practice triangular diplomacy at Moscow's expense.

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USSR - JAPAN - CHINA

MOSCOW EXPRESSES MISGIVINGS OVER JAPANESE-PRC RELATIONS

Soviet reaction to the special relationship emerging between China and Japan suggests that Moscow is feeling increasingly isolated in the four-power maneuvering with China, Japan, and the United States in the Far East. In contrast to Peking, which now meticulously avoids any negative comment on Japan's military relations with the United States as well as on the Japanese military establishment itself, Moscow is intensifying its warnings of remilitarization in Japan. Soviet commentators are also downplaying the possibilities of economic collaboration with Japan--a theme at its peak during Foreign Minister Gromyko's January 1972 visit to Japan--and have, since the Sino-Japanese rapprochement late last year, increasingly pictured Japan primarily as a powerful rival for economic and military influence in Asia.

Typifying Moscow's current comment, a 10 February PRAVDA article by A. Iskenderov warned of a "new" nationalism taking root in Japan which "serves as a propaganda cover to conceal the growth of Japanese imperialism and to justify militarism and foreign political and economic expansion." Iskenderov argued that Japan's leaders are encouraging narrow nationalistic sentiments in order to strengthen the self-defense forces "as an important means of guaranteeing the positions of Japanese capital outside Japan and, above all, in Southeast Asia."

Soviet misgivings over Sino-Japanese intentions were expressed explicitly in an article by V. Tsvetov in Moscow's weekly ZARUBEZHOM for 9-15 February. Focusing on the address given by Prime Minister Tanaka at last month's opening session of the Japanese Diet, Tsvetov criticized Tanaka for advocating the maintenance of the Japanese-U.S. Security Treaty and charged that budget increases for the buildup of the Japanese self-defense forces are creating "understandable concern in the countries of Southeast Asia and are in no way promoting the creation of

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an atmosphere of detente in this region."* Reflecting Soviet uneasiness over the direction of Sino-Japanese relations, Tavetov argued that "the world would welcome the adjustment of Japan-China relations if the Peking leadership did not attempt to place them at the service of its chauvinist, hegemonist plans and if it did not try to drive a wedge between Japan and the USSR."

Moscow has specifically taken Peking to task for abandoning its tough line on the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, which for two decades was portrayed by Chinese media as an instrument of the U.S. containment policy in Asia and thus aimed primarily at China. A Moscow broadcast to Asia on 12 February, for example, noted that "up until recently the Peking leaders spared no words to expose the aggressive essence of the Japan-American Security Treaty and the rejuvenation of Japanese militarism," but "then, all of a sudden, there was an about face." According to the broadcast, this change reflects an effort by Peking "to provoke a Japan-Soviet confrontation" by encouraging those forces within Japan who seek preservation of the treaty. The broadcast condemned Peking for helping Japanese reactionaries to revive militarism and for aiding the Japanese to carry out an "extremely unpopular expansionist foreign policy in Southeast Asia."

Seeking to play on opposition within China to Peking's shift on Japan's security ties with the United States, a Mandarin broadcast to China on the 14th insisted that "Mao and his confidants" have "endangered China's security and greatly damaged the Chinese people's interests" by encouraging Japan to strengthen its military alliance with the United States and build up its armed forces. After citing several old PEOPLE'S DAILY statements denouncing the treaty, and even a lengthy 1960 quote from Mao stating that the

* Unlike Moscow's coverage of Tanaka's Diet speech, Peking's detailed report omitted the reference to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. In contrast, TASS reports on the speech highlighted criticism in the Japanese press of Tanaka's call to strengthen the treaty. Similarly, TASS accounts of the recently concluded 36th congress of the Japan Socialist Party--the leading opposition party--focused on the JSP's resolution to work "for elimination of the military alliance with the United States." NCNA's report on the congress failed, however, even to mention the party's reiteration of its longstanding opposition to the treaty. NCNA highlighted the JSP's desire to "oppose all tendencies which may hamper Japan-China friendly relations and extensively increase intercourse between the two countries."

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security treaty is a "treaty of aggression . . . aimed at oppressing the broad masses of Japanese people and opposing China, the Soviet Union, and the peoples of Asia," the broadcast blasted the current Peking leadership for reversing itself and "greatly damaging the Chinese people's interests" by failing to see the treaty's basic "anti-Chinese orientation." Similarly, a Moscow broadcast in Mandarin on the 12th claimed that Chinese leaders had assisted Japan in strengthening its armed forces and its military alliance with the United States by "pretending ignorance" of Japan's "stepped-up war preparation." Attempting to freshen Chinese memories of Sino-Japanese relations during the 1930's and 40's, the broadcast asked Chinese leaders to recall and heed the words uttered by Japanese General Araki, a World War II war criminal, who was quoted as having said:

God did not give Japan the required natural resources, but China will divide its with us. God has predetermined to let Japan act as an alliance leader in Asia, and the road to this end is through China.

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C U B A - U. S.

HAVANA NONCOMMITTAL ON IMPACT OF HIJACKING AGREEMENT

Limited initial Havana comment on the 15 February signing of the U.S.-Cuban agreement on dealing with hijackings has been devoid of any suggestion that the agreement may serve as a catalyst for improved relations with the United States. One of two monitored commentaries on the agreement ignored the question of future U.S.-Cuban relations entirely, focusing on praise for the accord as "a triumph for Cuba." The other, by the influential commentator Guido Garcia Inclan, broached the subject obliquely and equivocally. But Garcia Inclan's equivocation may itself be significant, coupled with Havana media's failure to acknowledge and rebut Secretary Rogers' comments, at a news conference after the signing, to the effect that U.S. policy toward Cuba was unchanged and would remain unaltered until there was a change in the policies and attitudes of the Cuban Government. In response to such statements in the past, Castro and other regime spokesmen have repeatedly denounced U.S. efforts to attach "conditions" to improved relations and have insisted that it is Washington which would have to accept Cuba's conditions.*

Garcia Inclan's domestic service broadcast, on the 16th, distorted Rogers' remarks when he alleged that the Secretary "could not answer" newsmen's questions about whether the hijacking accord could be the precursor of other bilateral agreements. No other monitored Havana broadcast has mentioned Rogers' press conference. Commenting, ambiguously, that "such major state problems are always handled by the two countries and their heads of state," Garcia Inclan went on to cite a Castro dictum that a Cuban accord with "any country" could only be achieved "with equal candor, face to face, without seeking petty advantages." The net effect of Garcia Inclan's commentary was to convey a less rigid Cuban position than has been enunciated in the past, and to obscure a U.S. statement that would tend to dampen overoptimistic views of the imminence of detente.

* Castro has recently stressed unconditional lifting of the U.S. economic blockade of Cuba as the key prerequisite for any discussion of improving U.S.-Cuban relations. For an analysis of Castro's remarks in this vein in December, see the TRENDS of 20 December 1972, pages 24-25.

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MOSCOW COMMENT Moscow's reaction to the hijacking agreement, conveyed most authoritatively in a signed article in PRAVDA on 17 February, emphasized the Soviet view that the time is ripe for a U.S.-Cuban rapprochement. Under the title "A Positive Improvement," author V. Bolshakov observed that with the hijacking agreement the United States had "raised the visor of the cold war a little and looked into the eyes of reality." Commenting that efforts to blockade Cuba economically and diplomatically had failed, Bolshakov cited the recent statement by 12 U.S. congressmen urging a normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations and concluded that the "recommendations are extremely timely and unambiguous."

TASS, unlike Havana media, duly noted Secretary Rogers' press conference statement that the hijacking accord did not presage a shift in U.S. policy toward Cuba. But recent Soviet comment has publicized the congressmen's statement as evidence of growing U.S. sentiment favoring normalization of U.S.-Cuban ties. Thus an IZVESTIYA article on the 14th mentioned the statement in contrasting the position of "official Washington, which continues to remain stubborn, trying, as before, to pursue a policy of isolating Cuba," with "the sober voices of senators, congressmen, and prominent public figures" who are increasingly vocal in urging a rapprochement. IZVESTIYA concluded that the "short-sighted policy" of trying to isolate Cuba "is becoming increasingly hopeless." In a similar vein, a Radio Moscow broadcast beamed to North America on the same day lauded the congressmen's stance and forecast that "demands for a realistic policy" toward Cuba would "no doubt gain ground" in the United States and "eventually win the day."

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L A T I N A M E R I C A

HAVANA CASTS DOUBT ON REPORTS OF GUERRILLA LEADER'S DEATH

After initially ignoring the Dominican Government's 16 February announcement that Colonel Francisco Caamano and two fellow guerrillas had been killed, Cuban media on the 20th indirectly cast doubt on the Dominican claim of Caamano's death by publicizing a statement purportedly made in Havana by one of the guerrillas the Dominican Government said had been killed along with him. Concurrently, Havana media carried--without comment--their first acknowledgment of Dominican and Western media reports of Caamano's death. Cuba has been circumspect in its coverage of the 5 February guerrilla landing in the Dominican Republic, apparently out of concern not to lend credence to Dominican charges of Cuban involvement in the operation.*

Radio Havana reported on the 20th that Wellington Peterson, one of the allegedly slain guerrillas, had turned up at PRENSA LATINA headquarters to refute the reports of his death. Describing himself as a Dominican political exile who had been in Cuba for five years and was now attending Havana University, Peterson said the Dominican regime's report of his death was "aimed at involving the Cuban revolution in the Dominican internal revolutionary process." He declared that if Caamano were in fact in the Dominican Republic, he "would like to be with him as a simple fighter." Adding that he did not believe Caamano was dead, he labeled the Dominican report "a maneuver...to demoralize the people." PRENSA LATINA the next day reported a press conference at which Peterson said he was acquainted with Caamano and with the other guerrilla who had reportedly been killed but disclaimed any knowledge of whether Caamano was leading the guerrilla band in the Dominican Republic.

In response to the Havana report on Peterson, Santo Domingo conceded that its initial announcement of his demise had been mistaken. The body of the dead guerrilla was identified as that of Alfredo Perez Vargas.

Although initial Havana reports on the Dominican landing had referred only to widespread "rumors" of Caamano's involvement in the guerrilla landing, more recent comment appeared to

* For a discussion of Havana's early reaction to the guerrilla landing, see the TRENDS of 7 February 1973, pages 27-28.

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acknowledge it as a fact. Thus a radio commentary on the 14th referred to a communique by Dominican revolutionary organizations as "confirming" Caamano's presence at the head of the guerrilla band. The commentary depicted the Balaguer regime as being in a state of "panic" and noted "uneasiness in the Yankee embassy" as a consequence of the guerrilla landing. "Balaguer is frightened now," it said, "as he hears the roar of the revolutionary movement that is on the path of the country's liberation, which even now may not be far away." A PRENSA LATINA commentary on 8 February raised the possibility of a civil-military split in the Dominican Republic, suggesting that Caamano's return might produce "a rupture with Balaguer inside the armed forces ranks."

CUBA, URUGUAYAN COMMUNISTS DIFFER ON URUGUAYAN CRISIS

In a belated reaction to the Uruguayan civil-military confrontation, Havana took a critical view of the settlement reached by Uruguayan President Bordaberry and the military. Havana's position diverges from the generally favorable view of the settlement taken by the Uruguayan Communist Party (PCU). PCU Secretary General Arismendi is now in Cuba, and he met with Castro on 20 February, presumably to iron out these and other differences.

CUBAN COMMENT Havana's only comment on the Uruguayan developments appeared in a 19 February PRENSA LATINA article by Carlos Maria Gutierrez. Noting that the hopes of the Uruguayan left had been buoyed by the civil-military crisis, Gutierrez alleged that "results have yet to confirm these hopes." He referred disparagingly to the Uruguayan military's 19-point "reformist" plan of 9 February which Bordaberry had been forced to accept in order to resolve the crisis and to which the PCU had given qualified support; and he concluded that "facts seem to indicate that the program will remain a paper one." Gutierrez ridiculed the notion that "positive elements" existed within the Uruguayan armed forces. The failure of the Uruguayan navy to support Bordaberry throughout the confrontation, he observed, "indicated that any future democratic military movement has little hope of success."

URUGUAYAN CP POSITION By contrast, the PCU hailed the 9 February military communique as "a positive document," taking exception only to a clause stressing the need to combat Marxist-Leninist "infiltration and influence." The PCU organ EL POPULAR on 11 February editorially expressed agreement

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with the armed forces program, noting that it is "not incompatible" with working class ideology "or detrimental to our long-range plans for the establishment of a socialist society." Referring to the warning against Marxist-Leninist influence, EL POPULAR said "this is obviously a mistake, which is contradicted by the rest of the document and which could confuse a great many of the workers."

TASS on the 15th and Moscow radio the next day summarized a conciliatory PCU Central Committee statement which hailed the armed forces for beginning "to play an important part in the process" of instituting radical changes which would terminate "the rule of the oligarchy and imperialism." The statement also warned the military against assuming an attitude of "mistrust or reticence" toward the working class and advised against adopting a "negative view of Marxism-Leninism."

BACKGROUND Even before the recent crisis, Havana had depicted the Uruguayan military as having gained the upper hand over a weak executive. Havana frequently condemned the armed forces for torturing captured revolutionaries and for posing as "moralists" in the struggle against political corruption in Montevideo. A 5 February Havana radio commentary typically declared that Uruguay was following the path of Bolivia and Paraguay in falling victim to Brazil, "which has set itself up as the U.S. gendarme in South America."

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"we noted with interest the recent statement of Federal Chancellor Willy Brandt expressing readiness to settle relations between the FRG and Czechoslovakia."

DPA reported on the 20th that the Bonn foreign office had noted Husak's remarks "with interest" and was examining them. The report added that Bonn was awaiting indications that Prague was ready to adopt a "more flexible" stance on the Munich issue.

TASS on the 20th carried a report on Husak's speech which noted his remarks on Vietnam and the Middle East but omitted the passages on Europe and the FRG.

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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

PODGORNY'S 70TH BIRTHDAY HONORS ARE COMPARABLE TO SUSLOV'S

On the occasion of his 70th birthday on 18 February, Podgorny received much the same honors as Suslov did on a similar occasion last November.* Like Suslov, Podgorny was awarded an Order of Lenin and a second Hammer and Sickle medal, his picture and a message of praise were given frontpage treatment in PRAVDA, and the awards were presented that same day by Brezhnev with a speech of warm praise. However, while Suslov was honored by the publication of a collection of his speeches and articles on the eve of his birthday, Podgorny received no such honor.

In his acceptance speech at the awards ceremony Podgorny appeared to be somewhat more solicitous toward Brezhnev than Suslov had been. Where Suslov had praised the Politburo collective, "along with the General Secretary, our dear Leonid Ilich Brezhnev," Podgorny praised the Politburo and noted "the great personal contribution" of Brezhnev, "who has been able to brilliantly unite and organize our collective and all our party"

* See the TRENDS of 29 November 1972, page 29.

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MOSCOW ON DOWNING OF LIBYAN PLANE

While Moscow has made standard propaganda attacks on Tel Aviv in connection with Israel's 21 February raid on two Palestinian camps in northern Lebanon, it has thus far reacted with relative caution to the incident later the same day of the Libyan passenger plane shot down over Sinai. TASS, in one of two dispatches from Cairo on the 22d, called the "criminal act" a "gross violation of the generally recognized norms of international law" and claimed that Tel Aviv revealed its "cynicism" with the "hypocritical condolences" offered by the Israeli Government to families of those who died in the crash. But Moscow has devoted only one commentary to the incident--also on the 22d, by TASS commentator Kornilov. And although Kornilov said the plane incident had touched off world-wide protests and TASS rounded up world reactions to "Tel Aviv's crimes," there have been no Moscow reports of Soviet protests at any level or any indication that the Soviet leadership has sent condolences to Libya's al-Qadhafi.

Kornilov's commentary coupled the "bandit attack" on the plane with the "new armed provocation" against Lebanon as efforts by Israel to terrorize the Arab countries, exacerbate the situation, and "exclude, at any price and by any means, the very possibility" of a peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict. But he concluded merely that peace-loving countries and peoples could not be "indifferent" to Tel Aviv's "air piracy" and that the world public demanded that "the aggressor immediately be curbed."

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